Perceptual ad-blocking is a novel approach that uses visual cues to detect online advertisements. Compared to classical filter lists, perceptual ad-blocking is believed to be less prone to an arms race with web publishers and ad-networks. In this work we use techniques from adversarial machine learning to demonstrate that this may not be the case. We show that perceptual ad-blocking engenders a new arms race that likely disfavors ad-blockers. Unexpectedly, perceptual ad-blocking can also introduce new vulnerabilities that let an attacker bypass web security boundaries and mount DDoS attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online advertising is a contentious facet of the modern Web. While being a revenue stream for websites with a global value of $200 billion [73] , online advertising is simultaneously seen by many Internet users as a source of intrusive or malicious behavior [38, 43, 56, 77] . The proliferation of adblockers such as Adblock Plus and uBlock [1, 6] has sparked a fierce arms race with publishers and advertising networks. While ad-blockers maintain large ad filter lists, publishers and ad-networks continuously adapt to evade them.
Perceptual ad-blocking [67] is a novel approach to detecting online ads that no longer relies on filter lists, but on visual cues associated with ads (e.g., ad-disclosure cues such a "Sponsored" link) [67] . As opposed to filter lists, evading a perceptual adblocker requires altering the visual content of an ad, thus possibly affecting human users' perception of them. Such tactics could degrade user experience or even violate legal requirements on ad-disclosure set by statutory bodies [21] and self-regulatory consortia [19] . For these reasons, perceptual ad-blocking is considered to be less prone to an arms race than ad filter-lists [67] . The alleged superior robustness of perceptual ad-blocking has drawn the attention of Adblock Plus-the developer of a popular ad-blocker-who recently unveiled Sentinel [7] , a neural network-based perceptual adblocker that can detect ads inside rendered webpages.
While the filter list arms-race has been extensively studied [35, 52] , little is known about the resilience of perceptual ad-blockers under attack. They are believed to be less prone to an arms race [67] , but their strengths and limitations have not yet been fully analyzed.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security analysis of perceptual ad-blocking. The nascent state of this technology brings forth a rare opportunity in computer security-to inform the on-going design of new systems and anticipate pitfalls. However, an exhaustive security analysis is impeded by the currently limited availability of concrete documented approaches and implementations. As a first step of our study, we review existing perceptual ad-blocker proposals, i.e., Perceptual Ad Highlighter [68] (henceforth Ad-Highlighter) by Storey et al. [67] and Sentinel by Adblock Plus [7, 53] , as well as ad-detection approaches that emanated outside the ad-blocking community (e.g., a neural network trained to detect images of ads [33] ). Then, we derive a unified architecture for perceptual ad-blockers that incorporates and extends existing techniques. Our architecture covers offline creation and online usage of perceptual ad-blockers, while allowing for varied approaches to the core ad-detection step. Given this unified view of the design space, we can now move to the central question considered in this work:
How robust is perceptual ad-blocking?
To answer this question, we first analyze the attack landscape unveiled by our unified architecture. We identify a panoply of vulnerabilities in each step of a perceptual ad-blocker's visual detection pipeline. Diverse adversaries-e.g., publishers, adnetworks, advertisers, and web content creators-can exploit these weaknesses to evade, detect and abuse perceptual adblocking. Hostile strategies range from classical attacks on web agents-e.g., resource exhaustion and content obfuscation-to techniques unique to the machine learning (ML) field, such as data poisoning and adversarial examples [69] .
We conduct an in-depth evaluation of the impact of adversarial examples on an ad-blockers' core visual ad-classifier. To our knowledge, this constitutes the first concrete application of adversarial examples to a real-world web-security problem. We rigorously assess the robustness of six visual classifiers, three of which are taken from existing implementations (two from Ad-Highlighter [67] and the neural network from [33] ). We also Fig. 1 : Ad-Blocker Privilege Hijacking. Jerry posts adversarial content to Facebook that triggers a perceptual ad-blockersimilar to Sentinel [7] -into classifying Tom's benign content as an ad (red box) and preventing it from appearing in every user's browser.
include three classifiers that cover previously unmapped areas of the design space-a feature matching model (SIFT [44] ), and two ML models with the same architecture as the unreleased Sentinel [7] . Our most ambitious classifier was trained to locate ads in screenshots from hundreds of news websites and, interestingly, generalizes well to domains never seen during training while running at a rate of 1.5 fps on a desktop CPU.
Attacks. We attack ad-blockers' visual classifiers by crafting near-imperceptible adversarial examples for ad-disclosures, ads, and native content. These enable publishers, ad-networks, or advertisers to evade ad-detection or trigger the ad-blocker on fake honeypots (to detect ad-blocking [50] ). Attacking adblockers similar to Sentinel [7] presents the most interesting challenges. For these, the classifier's input is a rendered version of a structured web document whose contents are controlled by different entities (e.g, publishers and ad-networks). As far as we know, no prior attacks on digital image classifiers operate under similar constraints. We overcome these challenges by crafting transformation-robust [9, 62] and universal perturbations [48] encoded as valid HTML controlled by the adversary-and which apply to all websites with near 100% probability.
Counter-intuitively, we further show that adversarial examples enable a new and powerful class of attacks, wherein the adblocker is fooled into acting on web content that the adversary has no control over. An example of such a "privilege-hijacking" attack is shown in Figure 1 . Jerry-the adversary-uploads an adversarial post to Facebook that fools the ad-blocker into preventing Tom's benign post from being shown to users.
Outlook. Our attacks are not a step in a "quid pro quo" arms race. Instead, contrary to prior beliefs, they are indicative of a clearly pessimistic outcome for perceptual ad-blockers. Indeed, ad-blockers operate in what is essentially the worst possible threat model for visual classifiers. Specifically, adversaries prepare (offline) digital attacks that aim to evade or falsely trigger a visual classifier that they have white-box access to. In contrast, the ad-blocker should resist these attacks while operating under strict real-time constraints.
(a) (b) (c) Fig. 2 : The AdChoices Logo. AdChoices is a standard for disclosure of behavioral advertising [19] . Ads are marked by the icon (a), with optional text (b) . Despite creative guidelines [20] , many variants of the logo are in use (c).
We qualify that the goal of this study is not to downplay the merits of ad-blocking, nor discredit the perceptual ad-blocking philosophy. Indeed, ML might, one day, achieve human-level perception. Instead our goal is to highlight and raise awareness on the serious vulnerabilities, previously overlooked, that arise from instantiating perceptual ad-blockers with existing computer vision techniques. Our results show that if deployed, perceptual ad-blockers would engender a new arms race that overwhelmingly favors publishers and ad-networks.
To summarize, our paper makes the following contributions:
• We conduct the first comprehensive security analysis of perceptual ad-blocking; • We propose a unified architecture for perceptual adblockers that incorporates and extends prior approaches; • We identify eight general classes of attacks against the various components of the perceptual ad-blocking pipeline; • We rigorously evaluate the impact of adversarial examples against six visual ad classifiers. Our attacks exploit the full adversarial examples toolbox-white-box, black-box, transformation-robust and universal attacks-applied to feed-forward, sequential and object-detection models. • We released all data and classifiers used in our work. 1 In particular, we built a novel neural network that locates ads in arbitrary webpage screenshots, and which may be of independent interest for use in non-adversarial settings.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND A. Online Advertising
Online advertising comprises four types of actors: visitors, publishers, ad networks, and advertisers. Visitors are users browsing websites using a web browser. The owner of a website, or the curator of its content, is the publisher. The publisher assigns parts of the website layout to advertisements. Typically, publishers outsource control of these spaces to one or more advertising networks. The ad-network (e.g., Google AdSense) is responsible for selecting and showing ads to visitors.
Many forms of web advertisement are governed by legal requirements. For example, the U.S. has Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulations against deceptive advertising [21] , and the European Union has an analogous E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC). These provisions have also spawned industry self-regulations, including those of the Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA)-which promotes the AdChoices standard for disclosure of behavioral advertising [19] (see Figure 2 ).
B. Perceptual Ad-Blocking
Perceptual ad-blocking is a new approach to ad detection that attempts to mitigate shortcomings of traditional rule-based ad-blockers. Instead of using crowdsourced filter lists (e.g., Easylist [2] ) that blacklist ads based on known URLs and HTML elements, perceptual ad-blocking relies on visual cuesthe same signals that enable human users to identify ads.
Perceptual ad-blocking was proposed by Storey et al. [67] . Their insight was that, due to legal requirements and industry standards, online ads are often explicitly identified to users, e.g., with a "Sponsored" link or the AdChoices logo. Storey et al. built Ad Highlighter [68] , a perceptual ad-blocker that uses classical computer vision algorithms (OCR and fuzzy image search) to discover ad identifiers in web pages.
The original definition of perceptual ad-blocking includes "behavioral" cues associated with ads, e.g., the presence of a link to an ad-disclosure statement [67] . Ad Highlighter clicks on "Sponsored" links on Facebook to check if they lead to an ad-disclosure page [68] . As we show in Appendix A, behavioral ad-blocking is a dangerous practice which enables exploits (e.g., CSRF, DDoS or click-fraud) with consequences beyond the ad-blocking arms race. For the rest of this paper, we identify perceptual ad-blocking with the use of visual cues only.
Perceptual ad-blocking has drawn the attention of ad-block developers such as Adblock Plus. Their Sentinel [7] project tackles the ambitious goal of detecting ads directly in rendered webpages. Sentinel uses an object-detection neural network to predict the position of ads on website screenshots. Sentinel currently targets Facebook, and is crowdsourcing the collection of additional labeled Facebook screenshots for training [7] .
Perceptual ad-blockers are client-side programs running within users' browsers at a high privilege level. They can be implemented as browser extensions or directly integrated into the browser software (e.g., as for filter lists in Brave [51] ). A perceptual ad-blocker takes as input the webpage visited by the user, including all external resources.
Goals.
A perceptual ad-blocker has the following goals:
• Ad Detection. The main goal of an ad-blocker is to prevent ads from being shown to users. Perceptual ad-blockers need to reliably detect and locate ads on a webpage.
• Stealth. Many website owners attempt to detect adblockers [50] and take according actions (e.g., by requesting ad-blocking to be disabled). In addition to blocking ads, adblockers must strive to do so without being detected-either by the webserver or the publisher's client-side JavaScript.
• Non-Interference. Ad-blockers prevent detected ads from being shown to users by covering or removing web content. When altering a user's viewport, ad-blockers must guard against accidental (yet not uncommon) site-breakage [3] resulting from the removal of functional content.
• Performance. Ad-blockers operate under non-trivial timeconstraints as ad-detection should be completed on-and add minimal overhead to-page load time. Perceptual adblockers should visually process a web page in close to real-time, e.g., as a user scrolls through a page.
C. Adversaries
Ad-blockers threaten the online advertising business, wherein advertisers buy ad-displays on publishers' websites, usually via an intermediary ad-network. These parties have financial incentives to develop attacks that evade or detect ad-blockers.
At the same time, most of the above adversaries also have financial incentives not to display arbitrary malicious behavior. For example, publishers do not want to evade ad-blocking, if doing so harms regular users (e.g., by causing site breakage). Thus, in this paper, we assume that publishers and ad networks will only attack ad-blockers in a way that does not disrupt the browsing experience of users who do not use ad-blockers. 2 The same assumption does not hold for advertisers. As shown in recent works, malicious advertisers try to use ad-networks to distribute malware to users [77] . We thus assume the presence of malicious advertisers whose goal is to attack both website users and other actors of the online advertising scene.
As ad-blockers are client-side software, its adversaries have full offline access to its code. However, attackers do not know a priori whether a specific user is running an ad-blocker.
Attacker
Goals. An ad-blockers' adversaries have these goals:
• Evasion. Adversaries may attempt to evade ad-blockers, by modifying web content or ads in order to fool the ad-blocker's detection mechanism. They may also create content that abuses ad-blockers' behaviors (e.g., slow performance) in order to disable or impede them.
• Detection. Adversaries may attempt to determine whether a user is running an ad-blocker, and display warnings or deny content access. For example, ad-blockers can be actively detected by injecting fake ads (honeypots) into websites and verifying whether they are blocked [79] . 3
• Abuse. Some adversaries may try to attack users or other web actors. These attackers exploit vulnerabilities in adblockers or abuse their high privilege level.
III. PERCEPTUAL AD-BLOCKERS
In order to analyze the security of perceptual ad-blockers, we first propose a unified architecture that incorporates and extends prior work [7, 33, 67] (Section III-A). Then, we study the different ways in which perceptual ad-blockers can be designed, the techniques-from computer vision and ML-that can be used to identify ads (Section III-B). The attacks against components and search strategies are analyzed in Section IV.
A. General Architecture
A perceptual ad-blocker is defined by a collection of offline and online steps, with the goal of creating, maintaining and using a classifier to detect ads. Figure 3 summarizes our unified architecture for perceptual ad-blockers. The ad-blocker's core 2 How far a publisher is willing to disrupt the browsing experience of adblock users is less clear. Many websites try to detect ad-blockers and then display messages to ad-block users or downright deny them content. 3 Honeypots are used by many publishers [35, 50] and lead to an orthogonal arms-race on ad-block detection scripts, which we review in Appendix B. Our thesis is that hiding ad-blocking browser-extensions from client-side JavaScript is harder than previously thought [67] , and maybe currently impossible. classifier can range from simple computer vision techniques as in Ad Highlighter [68] , to large ML models (e.g., Sentinel [7] ). The classifier is created by collecting labeled web data. The type and amount of data to collect will vary for different classifiers. Due to continuous changes in web content (and an ongoing ad-blocking war), classifiers may need to be regularly updated-a process that can entail extending existing rules (e.g., for ad-disclosure detection in Ad Highlighter [67, 68] ), or re-training complex ML models such as Sentinel [7] .
When deployed by an end-user, the perceptual ad-blocker analyses data from visited pages, in order to detect and block ads in real-time. The online detection phase consists of three main steps. (1) The ad-blocker acquires the webpage and optionally segments it into smaller chunks. (2) The classifier labels each chunk as ad or non-ad content. (3) Finally, these predictions inform the ad-blocker's actions on the underlying webpage. For example, the ad-blocker may remove HTML elements that correspond to ads, or cover ad content in the user's viewport. For some ad-classifiers, the segmentation step may be skipped. For example, Sentinel [7] uses an object-detection network that directly processes full webpage screenshots.
B. Approaches to Detection
When online, a perceptual ad-blocker's first action is the "Page Segmentation" step that prepares inputs for the classifier. The granularity of the segmentation can vary, and informs the choice of classifier and actions taken to block ads. We distinguish three main approaches. The first-element-based perceptual ad-blocking-is the one of Ad Highlighter [68] . It searches a webpage's DOM tree for HTML elements that identify ads, e.g., ad-disclosure cues. The second approachpage-based perceptual ad-blocking-is used by Sentinel [7] . It ignores the DOM and directly classifies images of rendered web content. We identify an intermediate design between these two approaches-frame-based perceptual ad-blockingthat classifies rendered web content but uses the DOM for segmenting the page into regions likely to contain ads. 1) Element-Based Perceptual Ad-Blocking. Ad Highlighterthe original perceptual ad-blocker by Storey et al. [67, 68] searches for HTML elements that identify ads, e.g., addisclosure cues (see Figure 4 , boxes #1 and #2). The segmentation step uncovers HTML elements likely to contain adidentifiers, typically using pattern-matching filters. Since many Fig. 4 : Perceptual Ad-Blocking Elements. One ad (red box #3) is displayed in an iframe. The iframe contains an AdChoices icon (purple box #2). A custom ad-disclosure from the publisher is on top of the ad, outside the iframe (purple box #1). Publishers may use iframes to display non-advertisement content such as videos (e.g., red box #4).
ad-disclosure cues (e.g., the AdChoices logo) have standardized appearances, one approach to the classification step is templatematching-i.e., determining whether an image matches some pre-collected set of templates. Given the proliferation of small variations on ad-disclosure cues used online, exact (pixel-wise) matching may be insufficient [67] . A more robust approach is perceptual hashing (image-fingerprinting hash functions that aim at invariance against visual transformations). The classification step can also be cast as a problem for supervised ML. For instance, Storey et al. [67] use an Optical Character Recognition (OCR) model to identify textual ad-disclosures. Once an ad-identifier is discovered, the corresponding ad can be removed according to custom rules (e.g., if an AdChoices logo is found, block the iframe that loaded it).
2) Frame-Based Perceptual Ad-Blocking. The element-based approach above requires mapping elements in the DOM to rendered content (e.g., to ensure that the classifier's inputs are visible, and to map detected ad-identifiers to the ads that they pertain to). As we later show (see Section IV-B), this step is non-trivial and exploitable if ad-blockers do not closely emulate the browser's rendering of the DOM-a complex process that varies across browsers. Alternatively, ad-blockers can operate directly on rendered images of web pages-which many browsers make available to extensions (e.g., via the captureVisibleTab function in Chrome and Firefox).
Instead of operating on the entire webpage-as below in Section III-B3-ad-blockers can rely on some DOM features for segmentation-i.e., for extracting rendered webpage regions likely to contain ads. For example, in webpages that include ads served by an external ad-network, segmenting the page into screenshots of individual iframes provides a good starting point for ad-detection (e.g., Figure 4 , boxes #3 and #4).
For the classification of each segment, we consider two approaches. The first follows the spirit of element-based ad-blockers and identifies ad-disclosures within a presumed advertisement frame. Template-matching techniques are likely insufficient here, due to the high variability of ad backgrounds that ad-disclosures are overlaid on. Instead, we view this as an object-detection problem that can be addressed with supervised ML. An ambitious, yet more general approach, is to train a classifier to visually distinguish ad content. While seemingly challenging, this task was recently addressed by Hussain et al. [33] with promising results. We note that this classification problem is sound in principle, since humans are capable of visually identifying ads with reasonable accuracy.
3) Page-Based Perceptual Ad-Blocking. The core idea of perceptual ad-blocking is that ad-blockers can mimic the way humans visually detect ads. Element-based and frame-based techniques embrace this philosophy to some extent, but still rely on DOM information that humans are oblivious to. Recently, Adblock Plus proposed an approach that fully emulates visual detection of online ads from rendered web content alone [7] .
Page-based ad-detection requires large amounts of data to train classifiers that generalize to arbitrary webpages or content. To this end, Adblock Plus are crowdsourcing training data for Sentinel by asking users to upload Facebook screenshots.
In a page-based ad-blocker, both segmentation and classification are integrated in the classifier. Its core task is best viewed as an object-detection problem: given a webpage screenshot, identify the location and dimension of ads. Adblock Plus trained a YOLO object-detector network [58] [59] [60] on screenshots of Facebook, wherein ads had been labeled using ad filter-lists.
Once location of ads is predicted, the ad-blocker needs to figure out which HTML elements to remove. One solution is to rely on the browser API document.elementFromPoint which returns the (top-most) HTML element rendered at a given coordinate. An alternative to removing HTML elements is masking detected regions of the page.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTUAL AD-BLOCKERS
Section III introduced our unified architecture of perceptual ad-blockers. It consists in four steps (an offline stage and a three-step online stage) for which we showed three different instantiations. We now analyze the security of perceptual adblocking along both dimensions. We identify a panoply of attacks targeting each step in the ad-blocker's classification pipeline: the offline data collection and training (Section IV-A); page segmentation (Section IV-B); the core visual-classifier (Section IV-C); and the ad-blocker's high-privilege actions (Section IV-D). These classes of attacks have varying levels of Strategies are grouped by the architectural component that they exploit-(D)ata collection, (S)egmentation, (C)lassification, (A)ction. For each strategy, we specify which goals it can achieve, which adversaries can execute it, and which type of ad-blockers it applies to (fully: or partially: ).
Goals
Actors Table I and-when put together-threaten the viability of deploying perceptual ad-blockers.
A. Attacks against Data Collection and Training
Most visual ad-classifiers we consider (except for some element-based approaches) are trained from labeled images. The data collection and training phase of these ad-blockers can be vulnerable to data poisoning attacks (D1)-especially when crowdsourced (e.g., as with Sentinel [7] ).
An adversary can add malicious data into the training set in order to degrade the accuracy of the ad-blocker's classifier [12] , or target a classifier's robustness-in preparation of online attacks. For example, submitted training data can contain visual backdoors [17] , which are later used to evade the classifier.
Similar attacks against crowdsourced filter lists are theoretically possible (e.g., Easylist [2] ). For example, a malicious user can propose changes to filter lists that degrade their utility. However, new filters are easily interpreted and vetted before inclusion-a property not shared by visual classifiers. Here, malicious data may contain imperceptible perturbations, or backdoors in the form of legitimate website elements.
Incidentally, the crowdsourced data collection for Sentinel [7] raises some serious privacy concerns as it asks users to submit screenshots of their private Facebook newsfeeds. If deployed, the model might leak parts of its training data [25, 63] .
B. Attacks against Page Segmentation
In this section, we discuss two attacks on the ad-blocker's segmentation step. The first attack bypasses segmentation in order to feed unexpected inputs to the classifier (S1). The second attack forces the segmentation step to overflow the downstream classifier with an arbitrary number of inputs (S2).
Fig. 5:
Image Sprites of the AdChoices Logo. Image-sprites are sets of images stored in a single file, that can be segmented using custom CSS rules. For example, the left sprite allows to smoothly switch from the icon to the full logo on hover.
Our first attack-which we call bypassing DOM segmentation-targets ad-blockers that segment webpages based on their DOM, i.e., element-and frame-based ad-blockers. These adblockers assume an implicit correspondence between elements contained in the DOM tree and their visual representation when rendered. Consider the example of Ad Highlighter [67, 68] . This ad-blocker retrieves all img tags from the DOM and passes their content to a classifier. The ad-blocker's segmentation assumes that the image source of an img element is shown as is to the user. This need not be the case, as rendered images sometimes result from a complex sequence of operations and transformations, e.g., using CSS or JavaScript. Segmenting websites without taking into account these possibilities can cause the classifier to process images with unexpected properties.
Surprisingly, ad-networks and publishers already use CSS rules that significantly alter rendered ad-disclosures. Figure 5 shows two AdChoices logos found on cnn.com. In both cases, CSS rules are used to crop and display only part of the image. Such image-sprites are a common technique for minimizing HTTP requests, and highlight an easily exploitable blind-spot in some element-based perceptual ad-blockers-e.g., both logos in Figure 5 are ignored by Ad Highlighter [67, 68] .
The second attack introduces an unreasonably large number of HTML elements into the DOM in order to maximize the number of inputs fed into the classifier and exhaust ad-blockers' resources. We call this attack resource exhaustion via oversegmentation. An adversary could insert thousands of dummy images into a page's DOM-an easy workload for the browser. To reduce network traffic, these images can be dynamically generated in JavaScript (real ad-disclosures can be similarly created). When overworked, the ad-blocker's classifier may be forced to abdicate-i.e., refrain from detecting ads-to avoid exhausting system resources or degrading website load time.
To avoid resource-exhaustion, ad-blockers can rate-limit their classifier, but are then easily evaded by adversaries that generate dummy elements before loading ads. The ad-blocker could also more selectively pre-filter elements passed to the classifier. This results in a similar arms-race as with filter lists. For instance, ad-networks could modify ad-disclosure elements to evade these pre-filters, and website owners could try to detect ad-blockers by injecting honeypot elements that are detected by both the pre-filters and the downstream classifier.
C. Attacks against Classification
The classification step of the ad-blocker is responsible for the actual visual detection of ads or ad-identifiers. The robustness of this step is key to the ad-blocker's security. Any erroneous prediction can result in ads being shown (i.e., false negatives) or non-ad content being hidden (i.e., false positives). In this section, we present attacks in which adversaries manipulate the output of the classifier to evade or detect ad-blockers.
Adversaries can affect the classification process in different ways. Section IV-A discussed attacks on a classifier's offline training phase and Section IV-B described how an attacker can feed the classifier with inputs that do not match rendered content (the blame is not on the classifier here-i.e., "garbage in, garbage out"). We now focus on test-time attacks on an uncompromised classifier that processes actual rendered content. Adversaries can use adversarial examples [69] , inputs that are explicitly perturbed to subvert the expected classification [26] . Surprisingly, for most visual classifiers, the perturbation necessary to induce mis-classification is near-imperceptible to humans [69] . Adversarial examples can be used to generate perturbed web elements that fool the ad-blocker's classifierwhile being transparent to the user's browsing experience.
We consider four types of adversarial examples: (C1) adversarial honeypots (non-ad elements that are falsely classified as such-usually for detecting the ad-blocker), (C2) adversarial ad-disclosures that evade detection, (C3) adversarial ads that evade detection, and (C4) adversarial non-ad content that fools the classifier into missing actual ads.
To mount these attacks, adversaries need to account for the parts of a website that they control, and how these are input into the classifier. For example, the ad-network can only perturb images of ads or overlaid ad-disclosures. In turn, the publisher can make arbitrary website changes but usually cannot control (or predict) ads loaded in cross-origin iframes. For elementand frame-based perceptual ad-blockers, each classifier input is usually controlled by a single entity. For page-based adblockers however, the classifier's input is an image of the full rendered webpage-which an adversary can only perturb in specific areas by modifying HTML elements that they control.
As such, adversaries of page-based models may need to craft adversarial examples with specific structure, and under uncertainty about the content provided by other parties. The latter constraint is solved by making perturbations robust to random transformations [23, 40, 62] . This allows an adversary to generate adversarial page elements that succeed in fooling the classifier with high probability-when applied to pages with arbitrary content inserted by other parties.
A further optimization-enabling easy deployment of such attacks at scale-are universal adversarial examples. These are single perturbations that can be simultaneously applied to many different inputs that the adversary controls. For example, instead of requiring an ad-network to generate new adversarial examples for each ad they wish to serve, they can create a single perturbation that works for a large fraction of ads.
These intriguing constraints that apply to attacks on pagebased perceptual ad-blockers also result in novel exploits-that do not apply to element-based or frame-based techniques. As the page-based classifier produces its outputs based on a single full-page input, it is possible that adversarial perturbations localized to areas under the attacker's control could affect all the classifier's outputs-even on parts of the webpage that the adversary has no control over. The effectiveness of such attacks depends on the specific classifier used by the page-based adblocker. For example, we show that such attacks are possible against the YOLOv3 [60] architecture used by Sentinel [7] , and allow a publisher to perturb website elements surrounding ad iframes in order to fool the classifier into missing them. We call this attack evasion with adversarial content (C4).
D. Attacks against Ad-Blocker Actions
Ad-blockers typically run at a higher privilege level than any web page. Details vary by implementation, but ad-blockers are generally not affected by the same-origin policy and can read and write any part of any web page that the user visits.
Any privileged action taken by an ad-blocker as part of the ad-detection pipeline could be triggered by an adversary, possibly leading to an exploit. We showcase such a vulnerability in Ad Highlighter [68] in Appendix A. When the ad-blocker finds a "Sponsored" link on Facebook, it clicks it on the user's behalf and checks whether the link leads to an ad-disclosure page. Issuing HTTP requests on the user's behalf is a highlyprivileged action that the different webpage components cannot perform for obvious security reasons. Yet, we show that an adversary can abuse false-positives in the ad-blocker's linksearch routine to trigger requests to arbitrary domains.
A privileged action taken by an ad-blocker is that of removing or masking web content. Attackers exploit this action when using honeypot elements (false-positives for the classifier) that reveal the ad-blocker's presence. But triggering ad-blocking can have more pernicious effects. Figure 1 illustrates an attack on a page-based model wherein a malicious content creator (e.g., an advertiser or a social network user) crafts content that tricks the ad-blocker into blocking other parts of the webpage for all its users. This attack hijacks the ad-blocker's high privilege to bypass web-security boundaries (A1).
V. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES FOR PERCEPTUAL AD-BLOCKERS
We now conduct an in-depth study of concrete perceptual adblocking techniques and evaluate their robustness to adversarial examples. We focus our efforts on the core visual classifier in the perceptual ad-blocking pipeline. In doing so, we sidestep some engineering challenges that building full in-browser adblockers would entail, such as monitoring the DOM to collect inputs, or blocking positively classified elements. As noted in our security analysis (Section IV), these steps are non-trivial and themselves vulnerable to attack. This only strengthens our results. By mounting successful attacks that target the central visual classifier of the ad-blocker, we show that any deployment of such classifiers in a real ad-blocker would be vulnerable.
Our goal is not to propose novel attack techniques (prior work has introduced many attack frameworks [15, 45, 69] ) but rather to-for the first time-apply these attacks to a concrete websecurity problem. Our attacks do have some unique constraints, e.g., we craft perturbations encoded as valid HTML and usable by adversaries that control only parts of the classifier's inputs.
A. Methodology
Classifiers. We evaluate six different ad-classifiers-three are element-based, two frame-based, and one page-based. Of these, two are used in Ad Highlighter [67, 68] (fuzzy hashing and OCR) and one is an ML model from [33] that detects images of ads. We also introduce three new classifiers to better cover the design space of perceptual ad-blockers. One is a feature matcher (SIFT [44] ) robust to small image variations, and two are object detector networks with the same architecture as the unreleased Sentinel [7, 53] . One detects ad-disclosure cues in frames, and the other operates on full webpages.
As our ultimate goal is to reveal the limitations of perceptual ad-blockers under attack, we must guard against obvious pitfalls resulting from attacking models that we ourselves implement. The SIFT algorithm is fixed so these concerns are void. For the two ML models we trained, we explicitly separated (i.e., assigned to non-communicating authors) the tasks of (1) datacollection, design and training; and (2) development of attacks.
For element-based classifiers (and our frame-based model that detects ad-disclosures), we focus on the task of detecting the AdChoices logo. Two of the element-based classifiers above (fuzzy hashing and SIFT) match images against a set of precollected templates. For these, we use as templates a set of 12 AdChoices logos used by Ad Highlighter [68] .
Evaluation Data. To evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of the six classifiers above, we collect input data from real websites. We built an evaluation set from the top ten news websites in the Alexa ranking (the list is in Table IV ). For each website, we extract the following data: 1) All images smaller than 50KB in the DOM. This data is used to evaluate element-based techniques. We collect 864 images, 41 of which are AdChoices logos (17/41 logos contain the "AdChoices" text in addition to the icon). 2) A screenshot of each iframe in the DOM tree, which we use to evaluate frame-based models. We collect 59 frames. Of these, 39 are ads and 29 contain an AdChoices logo. 3) Two screenshots per website (the front-page and an article) taken in Google Chrome on a 1920 × 1080 display. These are used to evaluate page-based model. Each screenshot contains 1-2 fully visible ads, with 30 ads in total. To verify that the six classifiers do indeed work, we report their accuracy in Table II . For completeness, we add a simple blacklist classifier that searches for images that exactly match one of the 12 AdChoices logos used in Ad Highlighter. As posited by Storey et al. [67] , this approach is clearly insufficient.
Note that the datasets above are incomparable. Not all ads are in iframes, nor do they all contain ad-disclosures. Many DOM elements we collect are only visible after scrolling and do not appear in screenshots. Therefore, the accuracies of techniques evaluated on different data are often incomparable as well. This is inconsequential, as our aim is not to identify the "best" perceptual ad-blocker. Rather, our goal is to show that all visual ad-detection techniques are fundamentally broken in the challenging attack model we operate in. II: Evaluation of Ad-Classifiers. For each classifier, we first evaluate on "benign" data collected from websites. We report false-positives (FP)-mis-classified non-ad content-and false negatives (FN)-ad-content that the classifier missed. We then give the the attack model(s) considered when evading the classifier, the success rate, and the corresponding section. When reporting performance numbers for a classifier, we use an Intel Core i7-6700 Skylake Quad-Core 3.40GHz.
Adversarial Examples. Let f be an ML model. Informally, an adversarial example for an input x of f is an inputx = x + δ, where δ is a "small" perturbation chosen so that f (x + δ) satisfies some adversarial goal (e.g., f (x + δ) = f (x)).
In the visual domain, it is common to consider perturbations with minimal 2 norm (the standard Euclidean norm) or ∞ norm (the maximum per-pixel change), as these are acceptable proxies (from an attacker's perspective!) to human perception.
To efficiently generate adversarial examples, we approximate the adversary's goal by the minimization of a differentiable loss function L(x + δ). Typically, the loss captures similarity of f (x + δ) and f (x) (so that minimizing L changes f 's output), or distance between f (x + δ) and some target valueŷ.
Given a perturbation bound (e.g., ||δ|| ∞ ≤ ), we can minimize the loss with Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [40, 45] :
Alternatively, the so-called C&W attack [15] includes the norm constraint into the loss function and minimize L = L+α·||δ|| 2 where α trades the adversary's target with perturbation size.
Attack Model. We consider adversaries that use adversarial examples to produce false-negatives (to evade ad-blocking) or false-positives (honeypots to detect ad-blocking) in a white-box ad-classifier. These are attacks C1-C4 in Table I . Note that each of our attacks targets a single classifier-although they are easily extended to multiple models as discussed in Section VI. As most adversaries have no incentive to disrupt the user (see Section II-C), we focus on making attacks fully imperceptible. We mount evasion attacks that perturb any web content controlled by the attacker. We limit perturbations to small 2 or ∞ norm (we always measure p norms on images with normalized pixel values in [0, 1])-although real-world adversaries could use other types of imperceptible perturbations, e.g., [76] ). Again, this only strengthens our results. One exception to the above, are our attacks on perceptual hashing schemes which are by design invariant to small p changes but highly vulnerable to other imperceptible variations. The attack model used for all evasion attacks are summarized in Table II. For false-positives, the space of non-disruptive attacks is vast. We focus on one easy-to-deploy attack, that generates opaque (i.e., close to uniform) rectangular blocks that blend into the page's background yet falsely trigger the ad-detector.
We assume the publisher controls the page's DOM and style scripts, but cannot access the content of ad frames. This content, including the AdChoices logo, is added by the the ad-network.
B. Attacks on Element-Based Perceptual Ad-Blockers
Before delving into attacks, we offer our viewpoint on perturbing ad-disclosure cues-the AdChoices logo in particular. Laws on ad-disclosure exist to protect humans and mandate that ads should be identifiable by them. Adversarial cues visually indistinguishable from benign ones do fulfill this goal. The DAA has restrictions on alterations to the AdChoices logo [20] . Yet, of 41 logos we collected from ten of the most visited websites on the Web, we found 19 clearly different logo variants (see Figure 2 , (c))-indicating a lack of adherence to this rule.
Moreover, adversarial false-positives-i.e., elements ignored by users yet classified as ad-disclosures-are not bound by any regulations. Publishers can use these to detect any ad-blocker that is not perfectly stealthy-a daunting task except maybe for browser-integrated solutions, as we discuss in Appendix B.
Examples of false-positives and false-negatives, created for each element-based technique, are in Figure III. 1) Template Matching with Average Hashing. To detect the AdChoices logo, Storey et al. [67] use perceptual hashes-that produce similar values for perceptually close inputs. A simple perceptual hash is average hashing: (1) the input image is resized to a fixed dimension; (2) the i th entry in the binary hash is 1 if the i th pixel is above the mean pixel value. As in Ad Highlighter [68] , we resize to 25 × 25 pixels and match images whose hashes have a Hamming distance below 0.2 · 25 2 .
Accuracy. On our evaluation set, average hashing matches 38/40 of the AdChoices logos. The false-negatives are two copies of the same image-sprite depicted in Figure 5 (left).
Average hash is fast (4 ms per image) but incurs three falsepositives (a recurrent issue raised by Ad Highlighter users [68] ).
Robustness. Average hashing is by design robust to changes of small p norm. E.g., if ||δ|| ∞ ≤ , then only those pixels within 2 of the mean can modify the hash if perturbed. This invariance to small p changes comes at the cost of high sensitivity to other small perturbations, such as translations. For all the logos in our evaluation set, we evade average hashing by adding at most 3 fully-transparent rows and columns to the logo. When overlaid on an ad, the rendered content is identical.
False-positives for average hashing are trivial. Given a hash H and a color c > 1, we create an image x where x i = c + H i − 1. This image is near-constant and hashes to H. For images of arbitrary dimensions, we cast this as an optimization problem of finding an image that is close to x after resizing.
2) Template Matching with SIFT. We suggest a more robust template-matching model using feature detectors-algorithms that extract relevant features from images (e.g., corners, edges, etc). We use SIFT [44] , which detects "keypoints" in images and aims at scale and rotation invariance. SIFT matches images by the number of keypoints they have in common.
SIFT has difficulties with very small images, so we resize inputs to at least 120px, and only detect the textual version of the AdChoices logo. We declare a match if an image's keypoints match over 20% of the keypoints of one template.
Accuracy. SIFT matches all 17 textual AdChoices logos in our dataset, but has two false positives. At 30ms per image, SIFT needs 4 seconds to classify all 144 images in the most complex website in our dataset.
Robustness. SIFT is non-parametric (i.e., with no learnable parameters). Thus, the standard attack paradigm of minimizing the model's training-loss function does not apply [69] . However, it is not hard to formulate a (mostly) continuous loss function L SIFT (x + δ) as a proxy for the number of matched keypoints.
A keypoint output by SIFT is a vector v ∈ R 132 -four positional values, and a 128-dimensional keypoint descriptor [44] . Let t be a template with keypoint descriptors T . To match an image x against t, SIFT computes descriptor vectors for x, denoted {v 1 , . . . , v m }. Then, for each v i it finds the distances d i,1 , d i,2 to its two nearest neighbors in T . The keypoint v i is a match if the ratio test di,1 di,2 < τ holds (where τ = 0.6). Let M (x, t) be the set of keypoints of x matched with t. To evade detection, we minimize the size of M via the following (mostly) continuous proxy loss:
Minimizing L increases d ·,1 /d ·,2 for some matched keypoints until they fall below the ratio test. To create false positives, we minimize an analogous loss that sums over v i / ∈ M τ (x, t) and decreases the ratio. The difficulty is in differentiating L, as SIFT has many discrete steps. We make use of black-box optimization-NES [34, 61] in particular-to approximate gradients, which we then plug into a C&W attack. Table III shows examples of false-negatives that match less than 5% of keypoints of all templates and satisfy ||δ|| 2 ≤ 1.5. Also shown is shows a false-positive that matches over 50% of keypoints with a template, and satisfies ||δ|| 2 ≤ 1.
3) Optical Character Recognition (OCR). Many addisclosures-e.g., the full AdChoices logo-contain text. If the text was standard HTML, detecting these cues should be trivial-although DOM Segmentation attacks apply, and are already used by Facebook as we show in Appendix E. Facebook uses obfuscation tactics reminiscent of those aimed at email scrapers, an arms-race that resulted in images of rendered text.
To detect the "AdChoices" text in a logo, Ad Highlighter [68] uses Tesseract [5] , an open-source OCR system. We use a TensorFlow port of Tesseract's latest neural network model [65] . As in Ad Highlighter, we match an image if the edit-distance between the OCR output and "AdChoices" is below 5.
Accuracy. OCR detects 16/17 of the textual AdChoices logos, with no false positives. The one error is a logo with faint text that fails to parse. An issue with OCR is its high performance cost-it is disabled by default in Ad Highlighter [68] . With TensorFlow's implementation, we decode an image in 100 ms on average, a 14 second delay for our most complex website.
Robustness.
Adversarial examples for Tesseract's model were shown in [65] . Our attacks are simpler-but might produce larger perturbations-and detailed in Appendix D.
For all AdChoices logos in our dataset, we create adversarial examples that decode to a string more than 5 edits away from "AdChoices", and satisfy ||δ|| 2 ≤ 2. For false-positives, Tesseract ignores images that are mostly blank. We thus start from a black image, and produce an input that decodes to "dchoices" (1 edit), and has an 2 norm of 2 (see Table III ).
A Note on CAPTCHA Solvers. Transcribing perturbed textual ad-disclosures is reminiscent of CAPTCHA solving. Both the ad-network and CAPTCHA creator aim to create images of text that humans recognize yet automated classifiers do not.
CAPTCHA perturbations are much larger than the ones in Table III . Yet, ML has solved this task [13, 78] . These advances do not translate to ad-disclosure detection, which faces a much stronger threat model. Whereas ad-blockers are client-side software, CAPTCHA solvers are private algorithms that the CAPTCHA creator has no access to-even offline. Perturbations are thus designed to fool "generic" vision techniques, rather than specific models. CAPTCHA solvers have mild timing requirements (challenges time out after 2-3 minutes) which allows for more expensive models that are often run on GPUs (whereas ad-blockers have to run on client hardware). Finally, there is no clear avenue for exploiting falsepositives in a CAPTCHA solver, thus vastly reducing the size of the input space to be robustly classified.
C. Attacks on Frame-Based Perceptual Ad-Blockers
Hereafter, we consider two ML models that detect rendered ads. The first model extends the ideas of element-based adblockers, and detects the AdChoices logo within the ad. The second model was trained by Hussain et al. [33] and showed promising results in distinguishing images of ads and non-ads.
To circumvent any restrictions on perturbing ad-disclosure cues, we limit the perturbation of ad frames to the interior of the frame so as to leave the AdChoices logo untouched.
1) Object Detection for Identifying Ad Disclosures. Detecting ad-disclosure cues embedded in an ad image was not considered in prior work. We (one of the authors) trained an object-detector network for this task-using the same YOLOv3 [60] architecture as Sentinel [7] . The model was trained on a dataset of ads from Hussain et al. [33] . We train on 6,320 ads-half of which are overlaid with one of 12 AdChoices logos in an image corner, with some randomized padding. The model is trained to predict the position of the logo if present. After training the model, we use it to classify frames as ads, if the AdChoices logo is detected. The model achieves 99% accuracy on this task (at 100% precision) for a held-out test set constructed the same way as the training set. Accuracy. On our evaluation set of 59 iframes, the model achieves 100% precision and 83% recall (an AdChoices icon is correctly found in 24/29 frames). This suggests that our data generation pipeline did not fully capture real-world variations, but the approach seems sound. The model classifies a frame in about 650 ms, or 1-7 seconds for all frames in a page. Details on YOLOv3. As we detect a single object class, the model's output Y = f (x) is a matrix of size B ×5, where each row corresponds to one of B = 10,647 rectangular bounding boxes, each represented by four spatial coordinates and a box confidence score. To produce its final output, YOLO discards boxes with confidence below some threshold τ (typically 0.5), or with large overlap with another box of higher confidence. We denote the confidence of box b ∈ [1, B] as conf(f (x), b). Robustness. To evade ad-detection, all boxes predicted by the model should have confidence below τ . We minimize the loss
using PGD with bound ∞ ≤ 4/255. The parameter κ ≤ τ controls the model's (mis)confidence when fooled. With this attack, we evade all ads in our evaluation set. For false-positives-i.e., a fake object prediction-we increase all boxes' confidence by minimizing:
where κ ≥ τ . We start from blank images of dimensions in 2) Ad Classification. Hussain et al. [33] trained an ML model to distinguish images of ads from non-ads-in an effort of automatically labeling a large ad-dataset. Their neural
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D. Attacks on Page-based Perceptual Ad-Blockers
The Sentinel model [7] of Adblock Plus is not yet deployed, thus limiting our ability to assess its accuracy and robustness. Instead, we follow their approach [53] and train our own model. Adblock Plus limited the original scope of Sentinel to Facebook screenshots. Yet, as they note [53] , collecting training data on Facebook is hard, due to size restrictions on individual newsfeeds. Moreover, their crowdsourced collection of Facebook data raises some serious privacy concerns.
We thus focus on a broader scope here, of training an addetector for arbitrary websites. For this, one author trained a YOLOv3 [60] model to locate ads in a large dataset of screenshots from news websites in all G20 nations. Data collection was non-trivial: to label ads in web screenshots, we built a web-proxy that finds ad elements using traditional URL filter lists and highlights them in the rendered page. We also had to increase the diversity of ads present in our data by replacing duplicate ads with a larger variety of examples. We detail this process-of independent interest-in Appendix G. We collected 5,585 screenshots, and used half of them for training and half as validation. After training, the model achieves a promising F1 Score of 0.96 on the validation set.
Accuracy. We re-evaluated the model on 20 real web screenshots (i.e., without the above proxy). The model misses very small ads (less than 100px in height). This is due to omissions in our training data, and we thus ignore such ads hereafter. Of 30 large, fully visible ads, 24 (80%) are successfully detected. The model has two false-positives-a stock-price widget and a native news video. While possibly too inaccurate for deployment in an ad-blocker at scale, our model demonstrates the possibility of ad-detection on arbitrary websites, and is used as a reference for evaluating our attacks.
The model's architecture is the same as in Section V-C1 and processes a full page downsized to 416 × 416px at 1.5 frames-per-second (on CPU). This may suffice for ad-blocking. A video of our model in action on five websites not seen during training is available at https://github.com/ftramer/ad-versarial/ releases/latest. We will release our model to the communitywhere it may find applications beyond ad-blocking, preferably in non-adversarial scenarios (e.g., measurement studies on online ads).
Attack Strategies. Below, we present a collection of attacks on our ad-detector network. As in Section V-C1, we split up the tasks of designing and training, and then attacking our page-based object detector, between two separate authors.
We assume adversaries that control only parts of a page's content, and perturb those in order to reliably fool the adblocker, regardless of other parties' actions. To create adver-sarial examples under these constraints, we use universal [48] and transformation-robust [24, 40, 62] attacks.
Specifically, we pick a random set of inputs D and then minimize x∈D L(x δ) with respect to δ. Here, x δ denotes the act of "applying" the perturbation δ to input x. Depending on the attack, the perturbation is added pixel-wise to a small region of x-or directly replaces that region with δ. The loss L is usually L FN YOLO or L FP YOLO (see Equations (3) and (4)), and the inputs x are always fixed. To fairly assess the success probability of these attacks, we evaluate them on a set of inputs D independent from the set D used to craft the attacks.
Some of our attacks (C1-U and C4-U below) are made to be universal across arbitrary websites and their content. For these, the evaluation set D consists of the 20 screenshots of news-websites collected in Section V-A; the training set D has 200 screenshots collected using the procedure described in Appendix G (no website or ad appears in both sets).
The remaining attacks (C1, C3, C4 below) show how to finetune more stealthy attacks targeted at a specific domain. For this, we collected 200 screenshots of articles from bbc.com/sports. We split this dataset into a training set (90%) and evaluation set (10%) with no overlap in articles or ads. The attack strategies described hereafter are a selected subset of a vast attack space.
1) C4-U: Universal Ad-Block Evasion for all Websites. Our first attack considers any publisher willing to evade adblocking on her website. Contrary to what we discussed above, we show that a publisher can actually perturb the full webpage at a pixel level-including ad iframes-by exploiting CSS techniques. The HTML perturbation is a near-transparent mask, that is overlaid on top of the entire webpage (see Figure 8 ). The CSS properties z-index and pointer-events are used to display the mask over all other web content, but allow underlying elements to still be accessed and clicked normally.
At opacity α, the rendered page is given by
where δ is the mask and x the underlying content. Bounding α is comparable to bounding the ∞ norm. Adding a single mask over the full image is prohibitive, as the mask grows large in size and is tied to a fixed resolution (e.g., over 1MB for a 1920 × 1080 display). We thus build a smaller mask that is tiled horizontally and vertically over the page.
We find δ by minimizing x∈D L FN YOLO (0.99 · x + 0.01 · δ) over the 200 screenshots in our training set. The produced mask is 20KB in size, and evades detection of all ads in our test set (see Figure 7 , top right). This attack is "doubly-universal": it can be deployed by any publisher, and evades all ads. We tested this perturbation in Google Chrome (see Figure 8 ) and found it to be robust to scrolling and changes in viewport. Figure 7 (bottom-left) shows a similar evasion attack which disables the ad-blocker. Here, the transparent mask causes obviously incorrect predictions, thus coercing the adblocker into abdicating or breaking the site. We minimize x∈D L FP YOLO , so as to generate many box predictions. On all websites in our test set, this causes the model to predict abnormally large boxes or fail to detect real ads.
2) C1-U: Ad-Block Detection for all Websites. To detect ad-blocking, a publisher can inject honeypots-false-positives in the ad-blocker's classifier-and check whether the DOM is modified or not. We create a universal attack that can be applied by any website publisher. It takes the form of a small opaque footer at the very bottom of the website, which was perturbed so as to minimize x∈D L FP YOLO (see Figure 7 , bottom-right). Albeit hard to detect on black background, our attack required larger perturbations here ( ∞ ≤ 32)-maybe because the attack is in a region where ads are not common. The footer was trained on 200 screenshots and causes small false predictions for 19/20 pages in our test set. We verified that the attack works continuously as a user scrolls over a page.
3) Attack C4: Ad-Block Evasion on BBC.com. The above attacks are extremely powerful and can be re-used by any publisher. Yet, an ad-blocker might try to detect uncommon CSS tricks and remove overlays before taking a page screenshot. This would lead to an arms race on CSS obfuscation techniques.
Hereafter, we consider more stealthy attacks that are tuned to a specific domain and exploit the static structure of many webpages. We use articles on BBC.com (see Figure 10 ), most of which have an ad banner below the page header. Our first attack-by the publisher-perturbs the white background (20px in height, ∞ ≤ 3/255) below the ad iframe. We create the perturbation by minimizing x∈D L FN YOLO for 180 screenshots, and evade all ads on 20 test screenshots (see Figure 10 (b)).
Our second attack comes from the ad-network. We did try to create perturbed ads that evade detection on all websites, but generating a universal perturbation for this task was hard. As we show in Appendix G, the reason is that our model mainly focuses on the layout of an ad (which varies greatly between pages) rather than its content. We consider a different universal attack: Finding a single perturbation that an ad-network can reuse for all ads it displays on one domain-BBC.com. We generate a single mask ( ∞ ≤ 4/255), that can be added to any ad-banner and evades the ad-blocker in 19/20 cases. 4) Attack C1: Ad-Block Detection on BBC.com. As for evasion, ad-block detection can be made fully stealthy when tuning attacks to a single domain. Again on BBC.com, the publisher adds a small perturbed mask (50px in height) in the page's header and minimizes L FP YOLO (with ∞ ≤ 4/255). The attack generates a fake box with 100% success rate on our evaluation set of 20 random articles, see Figure 10 (c). 5) Attack A1: Cross-Boundary Blocking. We conclude our thorough evaluation of adversarial examples for pagebased perceptual ad-blockers with our most intriguing (and severe) attack on a Sentinel-like system [7] . The attackdisplayed in Figure 1 -allows a malicious user-Jerry-to upload adversarial content that results in the ad-blocker marking the content of another user-Tom-as and ad. This "crossboundary blocking attack" hijacks the ad-blocker's elevated privilege to melt web security boundaries.
The attack works because object-detector models-e.g., the YOLO models [58] [59] [60] -predict bounding boxes by taking into account the full input image. This is a design feature, which enables end-to-end training and increases generalization and speed [58] . This also means that adversarial content can trigger the creation of bounding boxes in arbitrary image regions. Our attack reveals an inherent vulnerability of any object detector applied to web content-wherein the model's segmentation misaligns with existing web-security boundaries.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we explored the design space of perceptual ad-blocking and presented different attacks to evade, disable, detect and abuse these novel ad-blockers. In this section, we provide an in-depth analysis of our results.
The Dawn of a New Arms Race? The aim of our work is not to downplay the merits of ad-blocking, nor discredit the perceptual ad-blocking philosophy-which is sound when instantiated with a robust visual ad-detector. Rather, our overarching goal is to highlight and raise awareness on the vulnerabilities that arise in building ad-blockers with current computer vision systems. Perceptual ad-blockers inherit a fundamental weakness of existing visual classifiers, wherein small input perturbations fully subvert a classifier's output [26, 69] . Section V showed various ways in which adversarial examples can be abused by the ad-blocker's many adversaries.
The past years have seen considerable work devoted by the ML and security communities towards mitigating the threat of adversarial examples. Yet, many proposed defenses do not hold up to improved attacks [8, 14, 15] . In a few instances, concrete progress has been made [37, 45, 57] , but is limited to small problems and adversaries with restricted abilities. Accordingly, we argue that as of now, using visual classifiers to detect ads merely replaces one arms race-centered on ad filter lists-to a new one centered on adversarial examples.
Strategic Advantage of the Adversaries. Our attacks do not constitute a "quid pro quo" step in this new arms race, but are indicative of a more pessimistic outcome for perceptual ad-blocking. The reason is that perceptual ad-blockers operate in what is essentially the worst possible threat model for visual classifiers. Their adversaries have access to the ad-blockers' code and prepare offline digital adversarial examples to trigger both false-negatives and false-positives in the ad-blocker's online (and time constrained) decision making.
An ad-blocker might resort to security by obscurity, by obfuscating its classifier code. Yet, the adversary can run the ad-blocker like any other user, so offline black-box attacks [34] (as we did for SIFT in Section V-B2) or model reverseengineering [54, 71] still apply and do not weaken an adversary. Also, ad-blockers could introduce runtime randomness into their detections, or deploy multiple implementations. Randomness is tackled by transformation-robust attacks [8] , while multiple models can be evaded simultaneously [30] . The adversary could also deploy multiple honeypots to detect specific ad-blockers.
The severity of the above threat model becomes apparent when contrasting it with existing defenses to adversarial examples. For instance, works on adversarial training [26, 37, 45, 70] assume restricted adversaries (e.g., limited to ∞ perturbations), and break down when orthogonal attack classes are combined [22] . Vulnerability to false positives (a.k.a. "garbage examples" [26] ) has not yet been addressed.
We note that detection of adversarial examples [27, 47] -a simpler problem in principle but also one far from solved [14] may not be applicable to ad-blockers. Indeed, ad-blockers face both adversarial false-positives and false-negatives, so merely detecting a perturbation does not help in decision-making. This challenging threat model also applies in part to adblockers based on non-visual cues, e.g., ML-based ad-blockers that use similar features as filter lists [11, 29, 36] . None of these have yet been evaluated against adaptive adversaries. Moreover, by virtue of not relying on visual cues, these models are presumably easier to attack in ways that are fully transparent to users (e.g., switching ad domains).
Other Challenges for Perceptual Ad-Blockers. For argument's sake, we assume that adversarial examples have been solved (i.e., we can train ad-classifiers with near-human perceptibly). Even then, other challenges for perceptual ad-blockers remain, as highlighted by the large attack space covered in Section IV. For example, robustness to data poisoning is orthogonal to robustness to adversarial examples. Also, any segmentation step preceding the robust classifier, might still be vulnerable. Moreover, a truly robust model might be too expensive to run in user browsers. Finally, a core challenge of visual ad-blockers is their updatability. When mistakes are discovered-either due to organic or adversarial changes in web content-adapting an existing ML model is not straightforward and might require arduous retraining, only for the new model to immediately be available to attackers when re-deployed.
VII. RELATED WORK
Our work bridges two main areas of computer security research-studies of the online ad-ecosystem and associated adblocking arms-race, and adversarial examples for ML models.
Behavioral Advertising. In 2015, Pujol et al. [56] found that 22% of regular web users use ad-blockers, mainly due to intrusive behavior [38, 56, 64, 72] . The use of ad-disclosure cueswhich some perceptual ad-blockers rely on-is rising. On the Alexa top 500 sites, the fraction of ads with an AdChoices logo has grown from 10% to 60% in five years [31, 67] . Yet, despite this, less than 27% of users understand the meaning of this logo [42, 72] ) thus casting doubts on its effectiveness.
Ad-Blocking. Limitations of filter lists are well-studied [46, 74, 75] . Many new ad-blocker designs (e.g., [11, 29, 36] ) replace hard-coded rules with ML models trained on similar features (e.g., markup [18] or URLs [39] ). These works either do not study the robustness of their classifiers, or limit their analysis to non-adaptive attacks. Our work is the first to conduct a rigorous evaluation of a ML-based ad-blocker.
Ad-block detection has spawned an arms-race around publishers' use of honeypots and "anti-ad-blocking" scripts [49, 50, 52] , a general technique that applies to any ad-blocker. Iqbal et al. [35] and Zhu et al. [79] propose to detect anti-ad-blocking using respectively code analysis and differential-testing. These techniques are hard to implement as browser-extensions and their robustness has not been thoroughly tested. Storey et al. [67] build stealthy ad-blockers-that try to hide from clientside scripts. Yet, as we discuss in Appendix B, stealthy adblocking seems hard to achieve with current browser extensions.
Adversarial Examples. Our work is the first to study adversarial examples in a real-world web-security context. Prior work has shown attacks on generic image classifiers [15, 26, 45, 55, 69] , physical objects [23, 40] , speech recognition [16] and malware detection [28] among others. We borrow from white-box attacks on visual classifiers [15, 45] , sequential models [16, 65] and object detectors [23] . We also show that black-box attacks [34] offer a generic alternative to prior attacks on classical vision models such as SIFT [32] .
Perceptual ad-blockers introduce a novel combination of challenges for adversarial examples. Perturbing web content constrained by a structured document bares similarities to attacks in discrete domains, e.g., malware detection models for software [28] or PDFs [66] . Additionally, the ad-blocker's inputs need not be controlled by a single entity, a novel constraint for digital image classifiers which is reminiscent of some of the challenges with building physical-world attacks [24, 41, 62] .
Defenses against adversarial examples are intensively sought for. Adversarial training appears as the most viable strategy [26, 41, 45, 70] . Yet, these defenses operate in a much more lenient threat model than the one for perceptual ad-blockers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented the first comprehensive security evaluation of perceptual ad-blocking. To better map the design space of these nascent systems, we have derived a general, unified architecture that incorporates and extends existing proposals. An in-depth analysis of this architecture has revealed novel designs, as well as a panoply of vulnerabilities at every stage of the perceptual ad-classification pipeline. We have thoroughly evaluated the impact of adversarial examples on six concrete approaches to ad-detection-the first application of these attacks to a concrete web-security setting. We have shown how adversaries can exploit various methods from the adversarial examples toolbox-including black-box, transformation-robust, and universal attacks-to craft near-imperceptible ads, addisclosures, and native content, in order to evade or detect an adblocker. Finally, we have discovered a novel and powerful class of attacks on ad-blockers based on object-detector networks, wherein a malicious user fools the model into taking actions over content supposedly protected by web-security boundaries.
The overarching goal of this analysis has been to highlight and raise awareness of the fundamental vulnerabilities that perceptual ad-blockers inherit from existing vision classifiers. As long as robust defenses to adversarial examples elude us, perceptual ad-blockers will be dragged into a new arms race in which they start from a precariously disadvantaged positiongiven the stringent threat model that they must survive.
APPENDIX A DEFEATING BEHAVIORAL AD-BLOCKING
In addition to visual cues, behavioral features have been proposed for perceptual ad-blocking, i.e., detecting ads by their available user interactions [67] . The main way users can interact with ad-content is by clicking on them. Storey et al. [67] observe that ad-identifiers (e.g., the AdChoices logo) often direct the user to a disclosure page when clicked. Ad Highlighter [68] uses such behavioral cues to detect ads on Facebook. It parses the DOM in search for links containing the text "Sponsored" (see Figure 9 (right)) and determines whether the link leads to Facebook's ad statement page by simulating a user-click on the link and following any redirects.
These techniques are dangerous and enable serious vulnerabilities (e.g., click-fraud, DDoS attacks, CSRF, etc.) with consequences extending far beyond the ad-blocking arms-race. Clicking links on a user's behalf is invasive behavior, especially given the ad-blockers' high privilege level. Even worse, these vulnerabilities are exploitable by any party that can add links in a page, e.g., publishers, ad-networks, advertisers and sometimes arbitrary website users. To illustrate the dangers of behavioral ad-blocking, we create a regular Facebook post with an URL to a webpage with title "Sponsored" (this title can be set by the owner of any website). Facebook converts this URL into a link which Ad Highlighter clicks on. Albeit sound, this attack luckily and coincidentally fails due to Facebook's Link Shim, that inspects clicked links before redirecting the user. Ad Highlighter fails to follow this particular redirection thus inadvertently preventing the attack. Yet, this also means that Facebook could use the same layer of indirection for their "Sponsored" link. If the behavioral ad-blocking idea were to be extended to disclosure cues on other websites (e.g., the AdChoices logo), such attacks would also be easily mounted. Pre-filtering inputs passed to a behavioral layer does not help (e.g., only clicking on images that some other model has detected as being the AdChoices logo). Either the filter is perfect, in which case no extra step is required-or its false positives can be exploited to trigger the behavioral component.
APPENDIX B THE AD-BLOCKER DETECTION ARMS RACE
Many publishers actively detect presence of ad-blockers [35, 50, 52] which allows for fine-grained actionability, ranging from user warnings to service disabling for ad-block users. Ad-block detection operates among three main axes [67] : (1) detecting absence of known ads; (2) injecting "honeypots" and detecting that they are mistakenly blocked, and (3) Detecting ad-blocking code through side-channels such as timing.
Perceptual ad-blockers cannot be detected server-side as they do not block or emit any web requests. To remain undetected, a perceptual ad-blocker thus only requires to fool publisher JavaScript code into observing an unmodified DOM [67] . This is a surmountable challenge for native in-browser ad-blockers, as these can simply modify the user's view without affecting the DOM. Yet, the main ad-blockers today are browser extensions, which do not have such high privilege levels and share the same JavaScript API as client scripts. Storey et al. [67] suggest the following arms-race for a stealthy JavaScript ad-blocker: 1) The ad-blocker modifies the DOM to block or mask detected ads (possibly including honeypots). It then overwrites the JavaScript DOM traversal API-e.g., using proxies 4so that the publisher's code sees the original DOM. For each, we extract all images below 50 KB, all iframes, and take two screenshots (the front page and an article) of the user's viewport, and report the number of visible ads in these.
2) The publisher inspects changes to global APIs by using toString() to unveil changes on the function. 5 3) The ad-blocker overwrites the universal toString() method used by all JavaScript functions, so that it always returns the same value as for a non-blocked website.
We argue that this is not the end of the arms-race, by showing three strategies to detect or reverse the above ad-blocker modifications. We posit that detecting large overwrites of APIs is sufficient (even if the publisher cannot directly blame an adblocker), as such aggressive and stealthy changes are unlikely in benign contexts. Preventing the attacks below requires the ad-blocker to emulate a much larger set of JavaScript APIs, parts-of-which appear inaccessible to browser extensions. 1) Borrowing native functions. A publisher creates an iframe, which gets a new JavaScript environment, and extracts a "fresh" native function (e.g., toString) from it to unveil changes. In turn, the ad-blocker has to intercept 6 all iframe creations and re-apply the same changes. 2) Detecting non-native functions. The original toString method is native (i.e., implemented by the browser). Some properties differ between native and non-native functions and do not appear to be mockable (e.g., setting a native function's arguments property raises an error whereas this property can be set for JavaScript functions). 7 3) Timing. Finally, if the above attacks are solved by emulating a large portion of native JavaScript, this is likely to add significant overhead (e.g., for DOM traversal) which can be detected by client-side scripts interacting with a server. <a><span> <span class="c1">Sp</span> <span class="c2">S</span> <span class="c1">on</span> <span class="c2">S</span> <span class="c1">so</span> <span class="c2">S</span> <span class="c1">red</span> <span class="c2">S</span> </span></a> .c2 { font-size: 0; } Fig. 9 : Obfuscation of Facebook's Textual Ad-Disclosure.
(Left) HTML and CSS used by Facebook.com to obfuscate the "Sponsored" link that identifies paid-for content. When copied into a clipboard, the link reads "SpSonSsoSredS". (Right) A proof-of-concept where the "Sponsored" link is an (adversarial) image that Tesseract's OCR decodes as "8parisared".
APPENDIX C EVALUATION DATA
To evaluate adversarial examples on perceptual ad-classifiers in Section V, we collected data from the Alexa top ten news websites, that make use of the AdChoices standard (we excluded news.google.com and shutterstock.com which contain no ads on their front-page). For each website in Table IV , we extract all img tags in the DOM of less than 50KB, rendered content for all iframes, and two screenshots from the website's front-page and a random article.
APPENDIX D ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES FOR OCR
We provide some more details on how we generate adversarial examples for the OCR model in Section V-B3. Tesseract's OCR network divides inputs into n frames and outputs a matrix Y where Y i,j is the probability that the i th frame contains the j th character of the output alphabet Γ (with an extra empty token ). With greedy decoding, the output phrase is obtained by taking the most confident token in each frame and removing sequential duplicates and empty tokens.
To get a false-negative, the model's output should have high edit-distance with "AdChoices". We thus penalize entries in Y that correspond to decoded characters that do not increase the edit-distance. Letĵ i be the index of the most probable token for frame i and let b i be a bit that is set if the most probably token does not increase the edit distance. We then minimize n i=1 Y i,ĵi using the C&W attack (for the 2 norm). For false-positives, we pick a sequence of tokens that decodes to "AdChoices" and maximize that sequence's probability.
APPENDIX E OBFUSCATION OF AD-DISCLOSURES ON FACEBOOK
On Facebook, advertisements are disclosed via a "Sponsored" link in the post (see Figure 9 , right). As the link displays HTML text, detecting these ad-disclosures is trivial-in principle. The ad-blocker of Storey et al. [67] parses Facebook posts in search for such links (it also clicks on them, an extremely dangerous practice as we argue in Appendix A). Surprisingly, Facebook already tries to guard against perceptual detection of Sponsored links, by obfuscating the link text with zero-width characters (see Figure 9 , left). This practicean example of a CSS Obfuscation attack (see Section IV)mirrors early measures against online email scrapers, an armsrace that led many web-users to render email addresses as images. A downside of these practices is that they hinder accessibility tools such as screen readers.
We consider here a similar outcome for Facebook's Sponsored links. In the example in Figure 9 (right), the Sponsored link is actually an image of text (which we created). As with the AdChoices logo, ad-blockers could move to OCR systems to decode links displayed as images. But the example in Figure 9 (right) is not any image-it is actually an adversarial example for Tesseract-a popular open source OCR tool-that is transcribed as "8parisared" (edit-distance of 5).
APPENDIX F UNIVERSAL ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES FOR PAGE-BASED
AD-BLOCKERS ON BBC.COM
In Figure 10 , we display some examples of the evasion and detection attacks mounted against a page-based perceptual ad-blocker on BBC.com. A description of the attacks is in Section V-D3 and V-D4. Fig. 11 : Image Generation Step of our Data Collection Pipeline. Ads are detected in the original page using filter lists, and overlaid with opaque easy-to-segment boxes. We generate multiple inputs by replacing boxes with ads from a large dataset [33] .
APPENDIX G TRAINING A PAGE-BASED PERCEPTUAL AD-BLOCKER
As the trained neural network of Sentinel [7] is not available for an evaluation, we trained one for the in-depth analysis of Section V. We used the same neural network architecture deployed by Sentinel, i.e., YOLO [58] [59] [60] . Specifically, we used the YOLOv3 network [60] .
A. Data Collection
YOLO is an object detection network. Given an image, it returns a set of bounding boxes, one for each of the detected objects. To train and evaluate YOLO, we created a dataset of labeled webpage screenshots where each label corresponds to coordinates and dimensions of an ad on the image. We created the dataset with an ad-hoc automated system that we created. Our system operates in two main steps. First, given a URL, it retrieves the webpage and identifies the position of ads in the page using filter lists of traditional ad-blockers. Then, our system generates a webpage template where ads are replaced with placeholder boxes. The concept of webpage templates is convenient as it enables us to create multiple screenshots from the same webpage with different ads, a form of dataaugmentation. Second, from each webpage template, we derive a number of images by placing ads on the template. Original Web Pages. We acquired original web pages from online news websites. We used a list of news websites from allyoucanread.com, and retrieved the URLs of the top 30 news websites of each of the G20 nations. For each news site, we searched for the RSS feeds URLs. We discarded news site without RSS feeds. The total number of RSS feeds URLs is 143. We visited each RSS feeds URL once a day and fetched the URLs to the daily news. Template Generation. Given a URL of a news article, we generate a page template. We create templates using a modified HTTP proxy that matches incoming HTTP requests against traditional ad-blocker filter lists, i.e., Easylist [2] and Ghostery [4] . Upon a match, the proxy replaces the ad content with a monochrome box using a unique color for each ad. The monochrome box is the placeholder that we will use to insert ads. We manually inspected all templates generated during this step to remove pages with a broken layout (caused by filter lists' false positives) or pages whose ads are still visible (caused by filter lists' false negatives).
Image Generation. From each page template, we generate multiple images by replacing placeholder boxes with ads. We select ads from the dataset of Hussain et al. [33] . This dataset contains about 64K images of ads of variable sizes and ratios. We complemented the dataset with 136 ads we retrieved online. To insert pictures inside a template, we follow four strategies: 1) We directly replace the placeholder with an ad; 2) We replace the placeholder with an ad. In addition, we include one of four AdChoices logo variants by Google AdSense in the top right corner of the ad. The choice of the logo is uniformly distributed; 3) We augment a template without placeholders with by adding a large ad "popup" in the webpage. The website is darkened to highlight the ad; 4) We add ads as background of the website. We do this by inserting ads to the left-and right-hand side of the webpage. When inserting an ad, we select an ad image with a similar aspect ratio. When we cannot find an exact match, we resize the image using Seam Carving [10] , a content-aware image resizing algorithm that minimizes image distortion. To avoid overfitting during training, we limited the number of times each ad image can be used to 20.
B. Evaluation and Results
Datasets and Training Setting. The training set contains a total of 2,901 images-2,600 with ads and 301 without. 1,600 images with ads were obtained with placeholder replacement, 800 with placeholder replacements with AdChoices logos, 100 images with background ads, and 100 images with interstitials.
The evaluation set contains a total of 2,684 images-2,585 with ads and 99 without ads. These are 1,595 images with placeholder replacement, 790 images with placeholder replacement with AdChoices logos, 100 images with background ads, and 100 images with interstitials. Additionally, we compiled a second evaluation set from 10 domains that were not used for training (this set is different from the one used to evaluate attacks in Section V). For each domain, we took a screenshot of the front page and four screenshots of different subpages, resulting in 50 screenshots overall with a total of 75 advertisements. We trained using the default configuration of YOLOv3 [60] , adapted for a unary classification task. Accuracy and Performance. We tested our model against both evaluation sets. The model achieved the best results after 3,600 training iterations. In the first set, our model achieved a mean average precision of 90.88%, an average intersect of union of 84.23% and an F1-score of 0.96. On the second set, our model achieved a mean average precision of 87.28%, an average intersect of union of 77.37% and an F1-score of 0.85. A video demonstrating our model detecting ads on five never seen web sites is available at https://github.com/ftramer/adversarial/releases/latest.
We evaluate performance of the model in TensorFlow 1.8.0 with Intel AVX support. On an Intel Core i7-6700 CPU the prediction for a single image took 650ms.
Inspecting our Model. We conduct a preliminary and nonexhaustive study of the inner-workings of our neural network. By inspecting the model's activation map on different inputs (see Figure 12 ), we find that the model appears to primarily focus on the layout of ads in the page, rather than their actual visual content. Surprisingly, this shows the existence of a discriminative visual signals for ads that differ from the way human users would recognize ads. This insight raises an intriguing question about the signals learned by the Sentinel model of Adblock Plus [7] , which was trained solely on Facebook data. Their approach is somewhat incomparable to ours. On the one hand, their model is trained on web-content with a fixed and uniform layout rather than hundreds of different websites. On the other hand, ads on Facebook are visually much closer to the website's native content, compared to non-native ads. Thus, it seems unlikely that Sentinel would have learned to detect ads by relying mainly on layout information.
To generate the activations in Figure 12 , we compute the gradient of the network's output with respect to every input pixel (as we would do when creating adversarial examples), take the absolute value of the gradient, and apply a smoothing Gaussian kernel over the resulting image to remove noisy artifacts. The resulting image is converted into a heat map and overlaid on the original input.
